THE MAIN RESULTS
Consider a differential game associated with a system of m differential equations dxjdt = f (t, x, Y, 4 (to < t < To), (1.1) an initial condition Here the control functions y(t), z(t) c h osen by the players y, z are measurable functions with values in compact subsets Y, Z of some euclidean (or metric) spaces. The time t" is the capture time of the curve (t, x(t)) with respect to a given closed terminal set F in the (t, x)-space, and FI[T,, 03) x R".
The reader is referred to [5] for the general theory of differential games (with more general payoffs). Here we consider only the case of generalized pursuit-evasion games, i.e., the case where h(t, x, y, Z) > 0. The player y (called the evader) tries to maximize the payoff, and the player x (called the pursuer) tries to minimize the payoff.
We shall assume:
(AI) f(t, x, y, Z) is continuous in [t, , T] x RR" x Y x 2, and x * f(t, x, y, x) < h(t)(l x I2 + l), s ?i(t) dt < co. to
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(A,) For any R > 0, if 1 x 1 < R, 1% 1 < R then (As) h(t, X, y, .z) is continuous in [ts , TO] x Rm x Y x Z and h(t, x, y, x> 3 0.
(AJ The Isaacs condition holds (1.4) foranypERW,tO<t<TO,xERm.
(AS) For any t, < t < T,, , x E Rm, the set is convex. Introduce a variable x,+~ and define for any triple (y(s), z(s), X(S)) satisfying (1.1) and (1.2) [y(s), x(s) are control functions]. Let and define P(x') = qy, 27) = Xm+#>. (14 Note that this payoff is the same as the payoff (1.3) . Further, 5 is equal to the capture time of (t, x'(t)) with respect to the terminal set F'. However, instead of working with the system (1 . l)-(1.3) and the terminal set F, we shall work with the system (l.l), (1.Q (1.2) , (1.6 ) and the terminal set F'. The latter is more convenient since the payoff (1.6) is terminal and therefore the concept of generalized payoff set P, [d , T'] , with respect to (1. l), (1 S) here P, [A, r] is the generalized payoff set defined with respect to (1. l), (1.5) , (1.2) , (1.6). The condition (As) ensures that the set P&l, J'j is nonempty. Clearly V,+ 3 V,-. If V,+ = V,-, we say that the extended value exists; the number V, = V,+ = V,-is then called the extended value. From [5, Section 3.11 and [l, 61 it 
PROOF OF THEOREMS 1, 2
Without loss of generality we may assume that f (t, x, y, s) = 0 h(t, x, y, .z) = 1 if 1 x 1 is sufficiently large, since changing f and h for all 1 x 1 large does not affect the extended value. We may also assume that F contains all the points (t, x), t, < t ,( T,, , with 1 x 1 sufficiently large.
We first prove Theorem 1 under the additional assumption that h(t, x, Y, 4 3 ho > 0 (h, constant).
For any E > 0, consider the payoff Q&') = Q&J, z) = inf(p(t, x(t); xmtl(t> < E, to < t < ToI, (2.2) where p(t, X) is the distance from (t, x) to F. [6, end of Section l] , it follows that the game kth payoff QE has value. The main effort in the proof of Theorem I is aimed at deriving the last assertion under the mere condition (A&); this is the content of Lemma 2.4. Note that Lemma 2.1 is a consequence of Lemma 2.2 (which is proved i~deFendent~y of Lemma 2.1).
Let n be any positive integer, and let Now, for any y > 0, if ta < t < ti+r , then provided t,,, -ti = 6 is sufficiently small; this follows from the equicontinuity of the trajectories of (l.l), (1.2) . Combinkg this fact with (2.4), (2.9, the assertion of the lemma follows.
Denote by V*(Ms), V*(&) the upper and lower values of the games corresponding to the payoffs ME and QE, respectively. From Lemma 2.2 we then obtain LEMMA 2.3. Let (AJ- (As) and (2.1) hold. If V+(ME) = V-(ME) for any n, then V-yQJ) = V-p&).
We now come to the crucial lemma: (A4) and (2.1) hold then, for any n, V+(M,) = V-(IV,).
Proof. For clarity, suppose first that n = 1. If f, h are uniformly Lipschitz continuous in (t, x) then, by [6] , Y+(Ms) is the limit of W,+(t,, , x, , 0) (as E I 0) where w,+(T 4 = mW& , 4x&), dTo , x)xdxm+d on t=T,,, W,+(t, x') is bounded in t,, < t ,( T,, .
Notice that WE+(TO , x') = WE+(T,, , x, x%+~) is a monotone nondecreasing function of xm+r . Now, for any p > 0, W<+(t, x, x,+1 + p) and W,+(t, x, xmtl) can be obtained as limits of solutions Us+ and Us-(R -+ CO) of initialboundary value problems with the same parabolic equation as in (2.6), with U,+ = JKVci > x, xm+l + p), U,-= W,+(T, , x, xm+J on t = To, I x' I < R, and with U,+ > Us-on ( x' / = R, t, < t ,< TO . By a standard comparison theorem [3, p. 421 we conclude that U,+ 2 U,-if 1 x' 1 < R, to < t < TO . Hence, K+(t, x, x,, + EL) 2 K+(t, x, x,+J, i.e., (w%&t,> w,+p, $9 %+l) 3 0. Similarly Y-(&2,) = lim,, WE-(t, , x0 , 0), where WG-(t, x') is bounded in to < t < To , Hence, by (2.7), we can change the order of "min max" in (2.6) into "max min." Consequently, WE+ is a solution of the Cauchy problem (2.8). By uniqueness, W$ E We-. Taking E -+ 0, we get the assertion V+(M,) = -we&
Having proved that ~~(~~~ = ~-(~~~ in case f, h are uniformly Lipschitz continuous in (t, x), we can now prove the same assertion for genera1 f, h by approximation. This requires an estimate as in Theorem 2 of [G] . The details are similar to those in [6, proof of Corollary] or [I, Section S], and are therefore omitted.
We have proved Lemma 2.4 in the special case n = 1. Consider now the general case. We shall proceed by induction on the number of points ti I First we need a lemma of general nature.
Let g$(x') (0 < i < n) be Lipschitz continuous functions and introduce three payoffs:
where Vz+(x'(tlc)) is the upper value of the game associated with the payoff P2 . Denote by VI+ and V,C the upper values ~o~espondi~g to the payoffs PI and Pa respectively. further, the function V(MB; t& , xl) is monotone no~de~re~i~ in x,,, I A similar assertion is true for lJ-(ME; t,, , x'(&+)) with the same payoff (2.11).
We can now apply the argument given above for n = 1 (with 4, C& replaced by Q+% , tk) to conclude that and that ~i~~~~; &+a, x') is monotone nondecreasing in x~++~ . ~~i~~ completed the inductive proof, we note that the assertion (2.12) for k = I is a positive number. We claim v,+ = E", v*-= E", (2.14) of IV, under the conditions (Ai)-only. Finally, if (2.1) holds then the relation (2.14) holds also for the extended value IV, [2] , so that I', = IV, [when (AI)-hold]. By approximating h by h + l/n we can deduce that V, = IV, also when the condition (2.1) is omitted.
Remark. In the definition of Ve+, V,-we take P,[A, Tj where A, I' are strategies based on a sequence of partitions II, of [to , TO] into n intervals of equal length. If we take another sequence of partitions IlW, with mesh converging to 0, then we obtain another pair of numbers, say Vza, V,T~. The proof of Theorem 1, however, remains unchanged. In particular, if (AI)-and (2.1) hold then V& = V;, = E*. By approximation it follows that Vzn = V;, = V, if (Ai)-hold.
